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Abstract 
The ill-health assemblage comprises the networks of biological, psychological and socio-
cultural relations that surround bodies during ill-health.  The paper argues for health 
sociology to reject an organic body-with-organs as its unit of analysis of health and illness, 
and replace it with an approach to embodiment deriving from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ontology.  I set out the three key terms: the body-without-organs (BwO), assemblages, and 
territorialisation.  These concepts will be applied to health and illness, to develop an 
understanding of an ill-health assemblage.  I contrast this with the biomedicalised body-with-
organs, and explore the shaping of the ill-health assemblage in a case study. 
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Introduction 
Health and illness are phenomena that are material, experiential and culturally-contextual: 
diseases affect organs and cells, but also affect experience and identity, and manifest within 
contexts and across populations.  They are shaped by social institutions and cultural beliefs 
(Cromby 2004: 798, Turner 1992: 36), as well as by biology.   
 
In this paper, I shall suggest that – despite the elaborations of a social model of embodiment 
over the past 20 years -- sociologists often work with an implicitly or explicitly 
biomedicalised body-with-organs as the site of ‘health’ and ‘illness’, and as an ontological 
element of sociological analysis.  The institutions of medicine established this organic model 
of the body, founded upon a medical discourse on the body that has been elaborated from 
Hippocrates and Galen to the present day.  Foucault and others have described the 
development of this discourse over the past three hundred years, as modern hospitals emerged 
as locations for observation of the organic body (Foucault 1976), and the establishment of an 
archive in which the biomedical body is fully documented (Foucault 2002: 145).  The body-
with-organs is the focus for economic and political activity, for the disciplines of modernity 
and for the stratification of society by gender, ethnicity and age.  This discourse has also 
entered the popular domain, and medical advice or self-help books about the biomedical body 
are legion (Bunton 1997: 232-4).  These ideas about the body and health create the body-
with-organs (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 158) in which biology and the medical sciences 
define the body in health and illness.   
 
I will apply an alternative perspective on embodiment and ill-health, deriving from the work 
of Gilles Deleuze, in partnership on occasions with Félix Guattari (see, for example, Deleuze 
and Guattari 1984, 1988, 1994).  Deleuze’s perspective on the body first emerged from his 
reading of Spinoza (Deleuze 1992), in which the focus is not upon what a body is but upon its 
relations and its capacities to affect and be affected.  Deleuze contrasted the medicalised 
body-with-organs with a body-without-organs, an organic/non-organic confluence of biology, 
culture and environment (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 9).  The body-without-organs emerges 
from a sea of relations that may be physical, psychological or cultural.  This approach de-
centres the biological aspects of embodiment, while retaining biology and physicality as a 
(necessary but not privileged) component of the body. 
 
This perspective, I will argue, holds substantial promise, focusing on health and illness as 
assemblages of the relationships and connectivities that constitute non-organic bodies-
without-organs (networks that may incorporate other bodies, inanimate objects, technology 
and ideas).  Within these assemblages, organs are but one element, and neither biology nor 
the social is privileged over the other.  Health and illness assemblages are disseminated 
effects, no longer properties of an organic body, but emergent features of relationships 
between bodies and other elements (Buchanan 1997, Duff 2010, Fox 2002, Fox and Ward 
2008a). 
  
The paper is structured as follows.  I will first summarise the three key elements in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s theoretical position: the body-without-organs (BwO), assemblages, and 
territorialisation.  These concepts will be applied to health and illness, to develop an 
understanding of an ill-health assemblage.  I contrast this with the biomedicalised body-with-
organs, and explore the shaping of the ill-health assemblage in a case study. 
 
Deleuze, Guattari and embodiment 
Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist ontology denies privilege to the physical body, seeing 
embodiment as a wider process, emerging from an active engagement with the physical and 
social world (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 149-51).  The body-without-organs (BwO) is the 
locus for this dynamic encounter; assemblages of relations establish the limits that comprise 
the BwO; and territorialisation and deterritorialisation by assemblages define what (else) a 
body can do.   
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the body does what it does because of the dynamic interaction 
between two elements.  On one hand there are the relations (inward and outward) that a body 
has with its physical and social context, enabling it to affect and be affected (Fox and Ward 
2008a: 1008).  On the other, there is an active, experimenting, engaged and engaging agency, 
with the capacity and motivation to form new relations (Buchanan 1997: 83).  This contrasts 
with deterministic biological or social explanations, which can give the impression that the 
body is totally ‘written’ by its genes or by human culture, with little room for any originality.  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s model, the body is creative and engaged both biologically and 
socially, not a passive vehicle for the environment or the social context to mould.   
The Body-without-Organs 
 
This creative motivating force is a feature of all living organisms, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988: 315).  A bacterium, an insect, a bird or a domestic cat are all driven in ways 
appropriate to their nature: to find food and an environment niche, to find a mate and 
reproduce, perhaps to care for their offspring.  This motivation interacts with the relations to 
establish the limits of what the insect’s or the cat’s body can do (its capacities to affect and be 
affected).  ‘Hard-wired’ instincts drive non-human animals to fulfil their needs for food, 
shelter and reproduction, though these motivations are mediated through learning and 
experience to shape each animal’s idiosyncratic behaviours.  For human beings, things are 
more complicated (but the dynamic remains the same) because of the extent and diversity of 
our potential relations, our self-aware reflexivity, and our capacity for complex social 
organisation, economics, politics and culture.  We have relations which are proper to our 
physiology, to our environment, and to our aspirations to talk, to work, to love, to reason or 
whatever.  Humans develop broad (and highly individualised) capacities to affect and be 
affected by these myriad relations. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari call what emerges from this confluence of relations and creative 
potential the ‘body-without-organs’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 149ff), often shortened to 
BwO.  For them, the biological body of biomedicine (the ‘organism’ or body-with-organs) is 
unimportant.  From the moment of birth -- perhaps even before – the BwO is constituted out 
of this confluence between relations and creative capacity.  The BwO of the newborn infant is 
delimited largely by the drives for food, comfort and warmth.  Maturation and experience 
bring a multiplication of the range of relations, until for an adult human, they are myriad: 
physical, psychological, emotional, and cultural (Duff 2010).  The discipline of the nursery 
and the schoolroom, the gendering and sexualisation of adolescence, the routines of work and 
the growth and disillusionment of ageing progressively create the relations that establish the 
limits of the body (Fox, in press).  Indeed, this is the easiest way to understand the BwO, as 
the limit of what a body can do.   
 
Humans do not respond like computers to stimuli, but in complex and sometimes 
unpredictable ways that indicate an active, motivated engagement with living, the capacity to 
make choices and act on the world around us.  Deleuze and Guattari deny that a body’s 
relations (all the physical, psychological and social relations described earlier) directly 
Asssemblages 
determine what it can do.  Rather the relations contribute to what they call assemblages 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 88). 1 
 
Assemblages emerge from the interaction between a body’s myriad relations and affects (its 
capacity to affect or be affected), and develop in unpredictable ways ‘in a kind of chaotic 
network of habitual and non-habitual connections, always in flux, always reassembling in 
different ways’ (Potts 2004: 19).  Deleuze and Guattari use the metaphor of a machine to 
describe how assemblages connect body relations together (Bogue 1989: 91): they argue that 
every aspect of living, and our experience of the world, contribute to these assemblages.  
However, within an assemblage  
 
the relations between bodies, technologies, discourses, regimes of signs and power 
relations intersect in a manner in which no one term functions as determinant and in 
which the autonomous specific status of each, as different, in and of themselves, can be 
accounted for. Dominant relations of power/knowledge are never stable or eternal and 
as functional elements of an assemblage, they are open to becoming otherwise in 
shifting fields of connection (Currier 2003: 336). 
 
Assemblages are thus elaborated from disparate elements that can be material, psychic, social 
or abstract/philosophical.  For instance, there is an ‘eating assemblage’, comprising (in no 
particular order), at least:  
mouth –food – energy – appetite;  
 there is a working assemblage comprising, at least: 
body – task –money – career; 
a sexuality assemblage comprising, at least: 
sex organ - arousal – object of desire, 
a health-care assemblage comprising, at least: 
pathology - health professional –therapy 
and so forth.  The relations can be drawn from any of the domains, material or non-material, 
but in each case, the assemblage is dynamic not static: it is about the embodied process of 
eating or working or sexual desiring, not about a state of being.  Furthermore, the assemblage 
will vary from person to person, contingent on the precise relations that exist as a 
consequence of experience, beliefs and attitudes, or from bodily predispositions.   
 
Because humans have the capacity for psychological processing and social and cultural 
interactions, it is virtually impossible for their assemblages to consist merely of biological 
components.  While a new-born infant’s eating assemblage may comprise: 
hunger - mouth –food 
It is quickly elaborated into 
hunger - mouth –food – nipple – mother 
During childhood it will be further elaborated into 
hunger - mouth –food – appetite – tastes – mother – nipple 
with the relations to nipple and mother gradually fading in importance once weaned.  For the 
adult, however, an eating assemblage might comprise: 
hunger - mouth –food – appetite – tastes – money – shopping – dietary choices – time 
and many other relations particular to the context and experiences of the individual.  A 
vegetarian’s eating assemblage will include a commitment to ethics or ecology, while that of 
a food allergy sufferer will involve not only a negative relation to nuts, dairy products or 
whatever, but also the experience of an allergic reaction.  Both have emerged from an 
infantile relation to food, but in very different directions.  These differences explain why the 
embodiment of one person differs from another. 
 
The totality of assemblages creates the BwO, and thereby the conditions of possibility for the 
body.  Assemblages link the individual’s body to the social and natural environments (Bogue 
1989: 91), creating the substrate that both defines a person’s capacities and her/his limits.  As 
a consequence, bodies should be understood as  
 
neither fixed nor given, but as particular historical configurations of the material and 
immaterial, captured and articulated through various assemblages which to some extent 
determine them as particular bodies, but never manage entirely to exclude the 
movement of differing and the possibility of becoming otherwise (Currier 2003: 332). 
 
In a sense, the body is lived through the assemblages, which as note earlier, are always 
processual: they are about doing, not being.  Unpacking an individual’s assemblages can 
enable understanding of how a person may respond to her/his environment, her/his 
experiences of illness and healthcare, and may be the basis for therapy or support (Fox and 
Ward 2008a).  
 
A body may have a physical relation to gravity, a psychological relation to its parent, and a 
cultural relation to a nationality.  In each case, behind the relation, there is a force (strong or 
weak) at work.  Gravity acts on the physical body to constrain its movement, the parent acts 
psychologically as a force over behaviour and attitudes that may weaken over time as a body 
moves from child to adulthood.  Nationality is a force affecting embodied sense-of-identity 
and perhaps choice of partners or associates.  Each body has its own relations, but in all cases 
these relations bring to bear forces, pushing or pulling the body (more properly, the BwO) in 
one direction or another (Duff 2010: 625). 
Territories of the Body 
 
It follows that the BwO (with its assemblages of relations) is a territory constantly contested 
and fought over by rival forces.  The assemblages determine the overall shape, intensity and 
direction of the consequent vector of forces.  Importantly, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
approach, there is no need to differentiate the realm from which a force derives: physical, 
psychological and social forces can all be treated together.  An eating assemblage might 
include physical resources (scarcity or plenty of specific foods), psychological preferences 
and tastes, and cultural restrictions such as kosher requirements.  A vegetarian eating-
assemblage will include physical, psychological, social and philosophical and ethical 
relations, with their associated forces (Fox and Ward 2008b: 2587).  The outcome vector of 
these disparate forces limits the body to a vegetarian diet, except perhaps in circumstances 
where hunger becomes more dominant than ethical attachments, in which case the 
assemblage will modify, altering the body’s affects regarding meat and its ethical principles.   
 
Territorialisation shapes the BwO (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 67ff.), producing identity or 
definition.  The force of the sun’s gravity territorialises the earth as it travels through space, 
turning it into a ‘satellite’. Biomedicine territorialises an individual consulting a health 
professional, transforming her/him into a patient, and her/his malaise into a disease.  But all 
forces may be resisted.  The earth does not succumb entirely to the sun’s gravitational pull: 
its velocity through space acts as a counter-force that always seeks to escape the sun, and 
move away on its own trajectory.  The resultant orbit is the vector of force and counter-force.  
The BwO is thus both the site where the body’s relations territorialise, but also the site of 
resistance and refusal.  In this way, the BwO is constructed and reconstructed (re-
territorialised) continually.  For example, an individual consulting a health professional may 
resist and refuse the patient role, and find an alternative embodiment, such as a ‘consumer’ of 
health services (Fox et al 2005). 
 
As a model of embodiment, territorialisation provides an explanatory framework for how the 
forces of the social impinge on individuals or cultures, from class, gender and ethnic 
stratification through to the creation of subjectivities in people as, for instance, ‘women’, 
‘husbands’, ‘patients’ and ‘risk takers’.  De-territorialisation can shift the balance of these 
forces, either by application of cultural, economic or physical resources, or with outside 
assistance.  While physical forces may be overcome only through training or with the aid of 
technology (a Scuba suit will allow a human body to breathe under water), most social 
territorialisations involve some act of interpretation, so there are endless possibilities for de- 
and re-territorialisation.  Where forces are too strong to resist, outside help from a friend, 
another citizen or a caring professional may offer the necessary counter-balance to oppression 
(Fox 1999: 77ff). 
 
The Ill-health Assemblage 
This Deleuzian model of BwO, assemblages and territorialisation can be applied to explore 
the processes associated with health and illness.  Within this perspective, ‘health’ and 
‘illness’ are not as ‘states’ of an ontologically-prior body, but assemblages that actually 
construct the body (BwO) itself, and determine its limits (what else it can do).   
 
An ill-health assemblage is constituted from the myriad physical, psychological and social 
relations and affects that surround a body during an episode of ill-health.  At its simplest, we 
could imagine an assemblage comprising: 
organ - virus – immune system – symptoms 
However, for an adult, many other psychosocial and cultural relations will contribute: 
organ – disease – doctor – biomedicine - health technology – daily responsibilities - fear. 
Ill-health is shaped by these relations, which may have more to do with the emotional 
meaning of illness and the cultural contexts of ill-health then with the disease itself.  For 
instance, there is an assemblage with particular significance for the anorexic or the dieter 
comprising: 
mouth – food – body shape – control (Fox et al 2005). 
Potts (2004: 22) describes an impotence treatment assemblage that includes the penis, the 
sufferer’s partner, doctors, and Viagra or other pharmaceuticals. 
 Ill-health assemblages are not just constituted from such generalised relations.  At other times 
in history, or in other cultures, the ill-health assemblages will differ, contingent upon how 
diseases and illnesses were understood, and upon the institutions that cater for the sick.  
Reading Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility offers an insight into a Georgian ill-health 
assemblage in which forces of disease can strike at times of emotional imbalance, thrusting a 
body into fever and possible death, while Foucault’s (1967) Madness and Civilisation 
demonstrates the various assemblages surrounding mental health in past times.  Inevitably 
there will be also many relations and affects unique to the setting, circumstances, past 
experiences and other aspects of illness: people’s differing responses to illness and to health 
care are explained by the idiosyncrasies of their own particular ill-health assemblage.   
 
Figure 1 maps the breadth of relations that may contribute to ill-health assemblages.  They 
include biological factors, psychological and cultural responses, institutional structures, as 
well as concepts, theories, models and philosophies of health and illness, and the technologies 
that treat or manage ill-health.  Many of these relations are of course familiar to sociologists 
of health and illness, and to compare and contrast a traditional and a Deleuzian reading of ill-
health, I have used the three-way distinction between disease (a biological state resulting 
from an infection, an impairment or some other divergence from a biomedically-defined 
norm of bodily function), illness (an experiential state) and sickness (the social response to an 
episode of illness) (Eisenberg 1977: 11, Kleinman 1978) as one axis, mapping these against 
the categories of ‘biological/physical’, ‘psychological/emotional’ and ‘sociocultural and 
philosophical’ relations.   
 
Insert Fig 1 about here 
 
Unsurprisingly there is some congruity between these two categorisations, with most physical 
or biological relations being associated with ‘disease’; psychological relations associated with 
the experience of illness: and most sociocultural relations associated with how societies 
response to ill-health (sickness).  However, in the Deleuzian model, the categorisation of 
relations is of less importance: all relations that a body has may contribute to the assemblage, 
regardless of whether they are ‘physical’, ‘social’ or ‘abstract’ in character.  More important 
are the connectivities that are established between relations, which shape the assemblage and 
in turn territorialise the BwO and ‘what else the body can do’.   
 The ill-health assemblage is thus constituted from the unique patterning of relations and 
affects upon the body, deriving not only from the relations in Figure 1, but also from the 
idiosyncratic mix of relations accruing from an individual’s past experiences, beliefs, 
attitudes and commitments, and their idiopathic response to disease.  It follows that ill-health 
assemblages will differ from person to person, from episode to episode, as BwOs are 
differently territorialised by these ill-health assemblages.  Ill-health will tend to produce 
‘sickening-bodies’, in which the capacities of the body will reflect differing patterns of 
biological and social engagements from that of a body in ‘health’.  However these 
capabilities will depend upon the assemblages that produce them. 
 
This perspective on ill-health requires that we re-evaluate some of the fundamental building 
blocks of health sociology.  Ontologically, ill-health does not act on a prior body.  Rather the 
body (or BwO) emerges and is shaped by the ill-health assemblage.  Bodies are not the locus 
at which forces act, they are the production of the interactions of forces.  The concepts of 
‘disease’, ‘illness’ and ‘sickness’ are similarly effects of culturally-contingent assemblages of 
relations.  ‘Disease’, for example, is an effect deriving from a biomedical and scientific 
assemblage of relations in the top row of Figure 1; ‘illness’ from experiential and 
‘humanistic’ relations in the next row and so forth. 
 
The ‘Health’ Assemblage 
A health assemblage does not exclude the relations noted in Figure 1.  Many of these will be 
present in a health assemblage, but their capacity to affect the BwO will be attenuated by 
myriad other relations.  In Buchanan’s (1997) essay on Deleuze, he appropriates the term 
‘health’ as a metaphor for the body’s capacity to form relations, and to affect and be affected 
(Buchanan 1997: 80-82).  It follows that ‘health’ is not just an absence of ‘ill-health’ relations 
(as suggested in the biomedical model), but the opposite: the proliferation of a body’s 
capacities to affect and be affected.   
 
If the sickening-body has restricted or re-directed capacities, health might be defined in terms 
of a body’s widened capacities to make, resist and transform its relations.  These capacities 
include the body’s biological functions, its psychological well-being and the social and 
cultural ‘capital’ it can draw upon.  Friends, family and health professionals may be 
important in enhancing these capacities, tipping the balance towards health by providing 
physical, psychological, economic or sociocultural support and encouragement.  The ‘health’ 
of a body is influenced by  
 
... refracted and resisted relations, biological capabilities or cultural mind-sets, alliances 
with friends or health workers, struggles for control over treatment or conditions of 
living.  Health is neither an absolute ... to be aspired towards, nor an idealised outcome 
of ‘mind-over-matter’.  It is a process of becoming by (the body), of rallying relations, 
resisting physical or social territorialisation, and experimenting with what is, and what 
it might become (Fox 2002: 360).  
 
Health is never a final outcome in this Deleuzian perspective. Rather it is a process, a 
becoming-other that fluctuates along with the body’s capacities.  The BwO marks the limits 
of what (else) a body can do, but this is always in flux, always becoming other.  Rather than 
saying a body is healthy, we might talk about its ‘becoming-healthy’, or about the ‘healthing’ 
of a body, to remind us of the active processes involved and the fluctuating nature of 
embodied health.   
 
Both in the broad and the narrow sense of health, a person’s health or ill-health assemblage 
can be explored empirically, by examining its constituent relations and affects -- an approach 
that Deleuze called ‘ethology’ (Duff 2010: 625).  Duff (2010) argues that this kind of 
ethological approach may be used to explore human development from cradle to grave, in the 
‘five developmental domains of social, cognitive, emotional, material and moral 
development’ (Duff 2010: 629).  Fox (2005) assessed the biological, psychological and 
cultural relations that influence what an ageing body can do, exploring the combinations of 
relations that make ageing an individual experience.  Potts (2004) has explored how new 
pharmaceutical technologies such as Viagra that apparently enhance a body’s capacities may 
in fact limit what a body can do, with consequences both for those using the technology and 
those around them.  Fox and Ward (2006, 2008a) found a range of territorialisations of those 
using healthcare products, ranging from a traditional ‘patient’ strongly territorialised by 
biomedicine, through to a resisting consumer.   
 
The full import of this methodology for the analysis of bodies, ill-health and health emerges 
when applied to explorations of contemporary healthcare.  In the rest of this paper I want to 
assess the relevance of the ill-health assemblage for the politics of healthcare: focused around 
struggles over the ‘body-with-organs’. 
 
The Body with Organs 
Deleuze and Guattari were keen to distance their perspective on embodiment from the 
biomedicalised body-with-organs or organism (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 158).  This, they 
suggest, is a narrow territorialisation of the BwO, but one that is of particular relevance for 
those engaged in health care.  The body-with-organs is the outcome of powerful forces 
surrounding the professions and institutions of biomedicine, manifested on a daily basis in the 
medicalising processes that turn bodies into patients, healers and carers into health 
professions, chemicals into medicines, and episodes of ill-health into case histories and 
archives of disease (Foucault 2002: 145).  The sick, the convalescent, the disabled and the 
aged are all part of this territorialisation; the history of health has been written, and continues 
to be written within this territory of the body-without-organs.   
 
The body-with-organs offers a model of the body so invested with power and ‘knowledge’ 
that it can be hard to imagine an alternative, particularly when the subject of this 
territorialisation is sick, vulnerable and dependent on health professionals who apply this 
model of the body to inform their work and their interactions with patients (Kleinman 1988).  
However, the Deleuzian perspective suggests that this body-with-organs is only one 
territorialisation among many.  Social studies of health have been only partially successful in 
offering a rival territorialisation, rarely questioning the ontological basis for disease (for 
exceptions, see Figlio 1978, Foucault 1976: 9-10).   
 
Using Deleuze and Guattari’s model, we can understand the ‘patient’ and her/his ill-health in 
terms of the relations, forces and assemblages that construct her/his BwO: the limit of what 
their bodies can do.  If a BwO is also a body–with-organs, then this is a body fully defined by 
biomedicine.  An assemblage may be dominated by a few relations and affects: 
disease – doctor – biomedicine - health technology - hospital 
 
This powerful territorialisation diminishes the totality of relations and affects that shape the 
body’s assemblage, making it hard to achieve subsequent de-territorialisation (Buchanan 
(1997: 8ff, Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 150, Fox 2002): Being a ‘patient’ or receiving care 
can close down possibilities, creating a BwO defined and dependent: the cancer patient is in 
remission, the noisy child has ADHD, the veteran has become geriatric.  Singularity of 
purpose leads not to transcendence, but to death (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 149).   
 
Foucault’s work (1967, 1976) has pointed the finger at biomedicine in establishing the 
‘discourse’ of the patient, or as Deleuze and Guattari put it, a body-with-organs.  However, 
the analysis developed here suggests that the ill-health assemblage derives from a multiplicity 
of biological, psychological and cultural relations.  I want to explore this further, by 
examining a contemporary case study of the body-with-organs. 
 
A Case Study of the Ill-health Assemblage 
In a series of studies, Fox and Ward (2006, 2008a) looked at the emergence of ‘lifestyle’ 
pharmaceuticals: those intended or used for a purpose that ‘falls into the border zone between 
the medical and social definitions of health’ (such as male hair loss or erectile dysfunction), 
and those that ‘treat diseases that derive from a person’s lifestyle choices’ (for example, 
obesity or nicotine addiction) (Lexchin 2001: 1449).  I want to explore the ill-health 
assemblage surrounding one such treatment: the range of medicines such as sildenafil 
(Viagra) and tadalafil (Cialis) that can be used to counter male erectile dysfunction.  I will 
begin with one short but evocative comment from a user. 
 
My best friend at the office introduced me to Viagra a week after he saw my attitude 
change at the office due to my noticeable depression.  Thanks to Viagra, I felt I am 
gaining my manhood again, but now lazy of doing sex without the blue pill.  I am now 
becoming a big fan of Viagra, and afraid of having sex without Viagra. (George) 
 
This extract fuels the sociological imagination immediately.  There is a medicalisation of 
sexuality; the user has accepted the medicine as a magic bullet that can restore ‘normal’ 
function (Marshall 2002: 133); he has accepted responsibility for finding a solution to his 
problem through information gathering and responsible consumption (Applbaum 2006: 446, 
Fishman 2004: 202).  The medicine establishes a health identity in the user as dependent 
upon the medication to resolve their problem of living (Fox and Ward 2008a).  We may 
conjecture a Viagra-assemblage (cf. Potts 2004: 22): 
Viagra or other pharmaceuticals - erectile dysfunction - biomedicine – partners – doctors - 
Viagra-fied penis. 
 
However, we can also see the broader forces at work in creating an erectile dysfunction ill-
health assemblage.  First, there is a demand from the medical professions to find treatments 
for problems and conditions of the patients who consult them.  Professionals may feel 
impotent to address problems at the limit of what might be called disease, and welcome new 
treatments to meet their patients’ demands.  Second, there is the emergence of new scientific 
discoveries that can be developed as treatments for lifestyle conditions such as over-weight, 
impotence and hair loss.  Sometimes these discoveries are intentional, with others are 
serendipitous, as in the case of the drugs mentioned earlier that can be used in male pattern 
baldness.  Thirdly, the profit-orientation of, and competitive marketplace inhabited by  
industries such as pharmaceutical companies drives the continual search for new compounds 
that can be developed for market, or adapted to a new use.  The pharmaceutical industry is 
the most profitable sector of commerce, with a global market for prescription drugs worth 
around $700 billion in 2010, and annual growth of 10 per cent (Henry and Lexchin 2002).  
Business success or failure will depend upon developing new technologies and generating 
new demand.  Finally, the emergence of health consumerism fuels demand for effective 
treatments for problems and conditions, and creates a ready market for new products 
(Featherstone 1991: 172). 
 
These four forces accrete the Viagra ill-health assemblage in various ways.  These businesses 
produce not only drugs but also the medico-scientific knowledge that justifies the product’s 
value as the solution to a problem.  Drugs such as Viagra were promoted ‘through scientific 
claims about the medical benefit, efficacy and necessity, supposedly revealed by objective 
clinical research’ (Fishman 2004: 189).  Decisions by a government to fund a product for 
certain categories of patient may depend upon defining a body condition as pathology.  In the 
UK, Viagra is only available on NHS prescription for men whose erectile dysfunction is due 
to an underlying medical condition, or causes them ‘severe psychological distress’ (Sairam et 
al 2002).  In the US, a drug can only gain Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) approval if 
it treats an established ‘disease’ (Fishman 2004: 192).  Sometimes the emergence of an 
effective treatment may tip a body condition into a disease.  This was the case with the 
medical-sounding erectile dysfunction, which prior to Viagra’s launch was commonly known 
as male impotence, a term implying weakness (Newman 2006: 5).  Shyness has morphed into 
‘social phobia’, to be treated with Seroxat (Lexchin 2001), while the development of Ritalin 
may have hastened the acceptance of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder as a disease 
(Fishman 2004).  Health technology companies market their products to the medical 
professions, and to consumers where legally permitted.  The manufacturers of Viagra and 
rival compounds all adopted popular sporting figures to front their US marketing campaigns, 
to attract a secondary market of younger men who wanted ‘to improve the quality or duration 
of their erections’ (Newman 2006: 12).   
 
The ill-health assemblage of a Viagra user thus may be strongly shaped by economic, 
political and cultural relations, as well as by many more personal and micro-sociological 
affects.  Any or all of the relations listed in Figure 1 may contribute to the assemblage.  
Biological, psychological and social relations shape the ill-health assemblage and 
consequently the BwO of the user of a health technology such as Viagra.  The Viagra 
assemblage unsurprisingly works closely (though not exclusively) with a biomedicalised 
body, establishing a body-with-organs that will accept its definition in biology, though also 
encouraging reflexivity as an active, consuming body. 
 
Discussion 
The body-with-organs is a seductive model for embodiment: biological in essence, 
individual, imbued with independent agency and located within a social, economic and 
political nexus that applies and requires this model of embodiment (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988: 159).  In the case study, I have shown how biomedicine and capitalist production 
collude to produce scientific knowledge of the body-with-organs, along with the technologies 
to ‘treat’ its ill-health.  There is an economic imperative to the proliferation of the body-with-
organs in modernity, as well as a disciplinary one.  Sociology, if it adopts this organic 
substrate for its explorations of embodiment, also colludes within this hegemony. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari strongly rejected the territorialisation of the BwO into the organism, 
arguing for a line of flight into a new embodiment (ibid: 55).  In relation to mental health, 
they called this process ‘schizoanalysis’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 273); more generally as 
a political strategy for living, they called it ‘nomadology’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 23).  
The model of the ill-health assemblage set out in this paper suggests an ontology in which the 
body is no longer individual and organic; in which health and ill-health are marked not by 
aspects of an individual body but by connectivities and relations between bodies, objects and 
ideas; in which healthcare is re-focused upon these nexi of relations, and encompasses 
biological, psycho-social and cultural realms of action. 
 
Health sociology can benefit from this alternative ontology.  In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
model, the body (BwO) is clearly both biological and social, and by focusing not on what a 
body is, but upon what relations a body has with the physical, psychological and cultural 
environment that surrounds it, we are released from a nature/culture dualism.  The BwO 
emerges from assemblages of physical, psychological and social relations of a body, 
combining in unique ways that are always in flux.  It is like an uncharted territory, but one 
whose possession must be fought over, inch by inch, as it is endlessly territorialised, de-
territorialised and re-territorialised.  The endless permutations of living: of health, illness, 
sexual desire, ageing and death open up possibilities for resistance and for the sociological 
imagination.  Sociological research and social action can subvert the body-with-organs (and 
the institutions that succour, invest in and suck it dry), and supply a line of flight away from 
this organic territorialisation of the body.   
 
In this alternate ontology, ill-health and health are located beyond the physical body of 
biomedicine, within the network of relations that sociology studies.  ‘Health’ is the body’s 
capacity to affect and be affected, to form new relations, and thus to resist forces of 
territorialisation that limit these capacities.  The ‘health’ of a body is the outcome of 
biological capabilities and cultural mind-sets, alliances with friends or health workers, 
struggles for control over treatment or conditions of living.  It is neither an absolute (defined 
by whatever discipline) to be aspired towards, nor an idealised outcome of ‘mind-over-
matter’.  It is a process of becoming, of rallying capacities, resisting physical or social 
territorialisation, and experimenting with what is, and what might become.  Health sociology 
can pull apart, intellectually and in practice, the ill-health assemblages that affect the material 
lives of people and the public health of nations. 
 
This perspective makes health and health care intrinsically political.  For ‘patients’ and for 
everyone, the politics of health and illness are about engaging with the real struggles of 
people as they are territorialised – by biology or by culture, as they resist, and as they 
encourage others in their aspirations, development and lives.  Health is processual, and both 
at the level of the individual and the wider public health, this is a process that encompasses 
natural and social science disciplines.  For health sociology (as for social care, education, 
citizenship and every aspect of social action), the analysis developed from the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari suggests an agenda for its practitioners that fosters deterritorialisation in 
the bodies of those for whom they care (Fox 1999) and generates a politics of health that 
transcends economic and management perspectives.  To engage productively with such 
agendas collapses disciplinary boundaries and establishes a pressing need for collaboration 
between medical and caring professions, social and political scientists, social activists, indeed 
between every body.   
 
Note 
1. ‘Assemblage’ is a somewhat uncomfortable translation of the original French agencement, 
which has the sense of ‘fitting out’ (Phillips 2006: 108) or of creating a collage of different 
elements.  Both these aspects of agencement emphasise the act of making connections 
between disparate components. 
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 Figure 1: A typology of ill-health relations 
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